LMU München, Summer Semester 2019
- Time: Fridays 14:00—16:00.
- Location: Room M 207, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
- Language: English.
- Prerequisites: Familiarity with the fundamentals of formal logic is required.
If you have a heap of sand, and take away one grain, it is still a heap. This seems like an intuitively correct property of heaps: if you take away one element, it remains a heap. But keep taking away grains, one at a time, and eventually you will only have one grain left, and one grain of sand is not a heap—a contradiction. This paradox is known as the sorites paradox, or the paradox of the heap, and is one example of the more general problem of vagueness. Vague predicates—tall, fast, old, red—are everywhere in our language, so the fact that such basic forms of reasoning lead us astray when we apply them to vague predicates is deeply problematic. In this course we will explore the paradoxes of vagueness, and assess the different philosophical accounts that have emerged in response to them, such as supervaluationism, degree theories, contextualism, and epistemicism.
Content and readings
For details, see the schedule below. The schedule is both provisional and incomplete, and will be revised as the course progresses.
The course will be assessed by means of a final essay of 10–12 pages. Further details will be provided prior to the end of the course.
Introduction and overview. The sorites paradox and why it matters. Ways of resolving the paradox.
Russell on vagueness. The ideal language view.
Supplementary: [Hyde 1992].
Vague predicates and degrees of truth.
|24 May||No class.|
|31 May||Supervaluationism, part 2.||
|14 June||Epistemicism, part 1.||
|21 June||Epistemicism, part 2.||
|28 June||Ontic vagueness.||
Supplementary: [Barnes 2010].
|12 July||Higher-order vagueness.||
|19 July||Continuous sorites paradoxes.||
Required: [Weber & Colyvan 2010].
|26 July||The sorites paradox and ultrafinitism.||
Required: [Dummett 1975].
Supplementary: [Dean 2018].
|23 September||Assessment submission deadline.|
- Barnes, E. (2010). Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 5(11):953–964. [link]
- Dean, W. (2018). Strict finitism, feasibility, and the sorites. The Review of Symbolic Logic 11(2):295–346. [link]
- Dummett, M. (1975). Wang’s paradox. Synthese 30(3–4):301–324. [link]
- Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese 30(3–4):265–300. [link]
- Hyde, D. (1992). Rehabilitating Russell. Logique et Analyse 35(137–138):139–173. [link]
- Hyde, D. and D. Raffman (2018). Sorites Paradox. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). [link]
- Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press.
- Keefe, R. (2008). Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 3(2):315–324. [link]
- Keefe, R. and P. Smith (1997). Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
- Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 1:84–92. [link]
- Sainsbury, M. (2009). Paradoxes (third edition). Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, N. J. (2008). Vagueness and Degrees of Truth. Oxford University Press.
- Sorenson, R. (2018). Vagueness. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). [link]
- Tye, M. (1990). Vague objects. Mind 99(396):535–557. [link]
- Tye, M. (1994). Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 8:189–206. [link]
- Weber, Z. and M. Colyvan (2010). A topological sorites. The Journal of Philosophy 107(6):311–325. [link]
- Williams, J. R. G. (2008). Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Philosophy Compass 3(4):763–788. [link]
- Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.